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One of the main reasons for the growing discontent with international investment agreements 
(IIAs) is the perception that undue restrictions are being placed on the regulatory powers of 
governments. Indeed, adequate protection of regulatory powers has been a key feature of 
initiatives aimed at rethinking the legal protection of foreign investors, either by progressively 
replacing IIAs with domestic legislation,
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In this context, it is rather surprising to find in IIAs clauses like those contained in a 
significant number of Italy’s BITs, normally in combination with preservation-of-rights 
clauses. Article 12(3) of the BIT concluded in 1998 between Italy and Mozambique, for 
instance, provides: 
 
Whenever, after the date when the investment has been made, a modification should 
take place in laws, regulations, acts or measures of economic policies governing directly 
or indirectly the investment, the same treatment shall apply upon request of the investor 





The meaning of Article 12(3) seems sufficiently clear. It provides all investors of the other 
contracting party a total exemption from unfavorable laws, regulations, acts, or measures of 
economic policies adopted by host countries. From a different perspective, it neutralizes the 
exercise of subsequent regulatory powers to the extent that such exercise is directly or 
indirectly detrimental to covered investors. One may assume that the clause was included at 
the insistence of the capital-exporting party. 
 
The clause can be considered as the treaty equivalent of the most robust form of stabilization 
provisions, the so-called “freezing clauses”.4 Traditionally inserted in government contracts, 
these clauses protect foreign investors against subsequent unilateral action by host countries 
in the form of total or partial exemption from regulations enacted during the term of a 
contract. They arise mainly within extractive industries in sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern and 






Freezing clauses remain problematic, although their drafting has recently been more 
respectful of the rights and duties of host countries regarding the protection of societal values. 
They may prevent governments from pursuing their economic and social policies, and even 
have a “chilling effect” due to the exposure to claims of breach of contract, especially before 
arbitral tribunals. Israel’s Supreme Court has recently struck down a natural gas plan due to a 
freezing clause exempting foreign investors from regulatory changes in taxation, antitrust 
limitation and export quota for ten years.
6
 The decision is a powerful reminder of the 
importance not to restrict unduly the regulatory powers of host countries.  
 
The inclusion in IIAs of clauses such as Article 12(3) above has much more serious 
consequences than contractual freezing clauses, for at least three main reasons: 
 First, unlike freezing clauses contained in contracts, whereby specific commitments are 
given to particular investors, a treaty clause applies to all current and future investments 
covered by a treaty, making these immune to subsequent regulatory activities. 
 Second, clauses like Article 12(3) are drafted in particularly broad terms as to the nature 
and content of the legal instruments affecting foreign investors as well as their impact on 
foreign investments. 
 Third, investors of other countries that have a treaty with the host country may invoke the 
most-favored-nation treatment obligation to benefit from clauses such as Article 12(3). 
This could amplify exponentially the effects of freezing clauses (according to UNCTAD’s 
database,
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 for instance, Italy and Mozambique have, respectively, 75 and 20 BITs in force 
with third countries). One may wonder whether the contracting parties were fully aware of 
the potential implications of applying these clauses beyond the treatment of their 
respective investors. 
 
Freezing clauses can turn treaties into treacherous legal products, and governments should 
have a clear and compelling interest in neutralizing them. Indeed, concerned governments 
may be advised to closely review their IIAs to detect these clauses and carefully assess their 
implications. If appropriate, they should take steps to remove these clauses. This could be 
achieved simply and inexpensively through exchanges of letters, preferably with effect from 
the date at which the other party accepts the proposed amendment. Alternatively, parties may 
avail themselves of any other means permitted under the law of treaties, including the 
conclusion of protocols, a task facilitated by the bilateral character of most of these treaties.  
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